We ask whether a firm's choice of IPO price is informative in the sense that it relates systematically to the firm's other choices and characteristics. We find that both institutional ownership and underwriter reputation increases monotonically with the chosen IPO price level. We also find that the relationship between IPO price and underpricing is U-shaped. In contrast, post-IPO turnover displays an inverted U-shaped relation to IPO price. Moreover, firms choosing a higher (lower) stock price level experience lower (higher) mortality rates. Our results are robust to controls for market liquidity and firm size, and for partial adjustment of IPO prices based on pre-market information. r
Introduction
Firms have the opportunity to choose deliberately a level for their stock price both when they choose to split their seasoned shares and when they select an IPO offering price. At the IPO stage, once the firm has estimated its total value and the fraction of this value it wants to sell to the public, the division-often established with a pre-IPO stock split-into a total number of shares times a price per share would seem to have little economic significance. However, casual empiricism suggests that firms do not make this choice arbitrarily. Underwriters specifically advise their clients on setting the price level:
1 Underwriters generally tend to price the stock of initial public offerings at between $10 and $20 per share. Occasionally, they use an IPO price of $20 or more to create prestige for the issue. If the stock is priced below $5 per share, it would be considered ''penny stock'' and, therefore, subject to onerous SEC rules applicable to brokers. The institutional investment community also tends to shun ''penny stock'' issues. To get to a price range of $10 to $20, you may need to change your stock capitalization (by stock splits or reverse stock splits) to achieve the desired IPO price, based upon the valuation of your company and the proportion of your company to be sold in the IPO. -Frederick Lipman (2000) in The Complete Going Public Handbook.
The literature on stock splits (reviewed in Section 2) also provides some guidance on the question of whether firms prefer one price level to another because when firms split their stock, they choose a new, ''split-to,'' price level for their shares. In particular, studies by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) , Fernando et al. (1999) , Schultz (2000) , and Dhar et al. (2003) provide empirical support for the notion that lower share prices make stocks more attractive to individual investors. These findings are consistent with surveys of managers by Baker and Gallagher (1980) and Baker and Powell (1993) , which report that maintaining a preferred price level is the primary motivation for stock splits. In contrast, Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) provide evidence that institutions avoid investing in low-priced stocks. It is possible that this institutional bias may be due to the illiquidity of lowpriced stocks (McInish and Wood, 1992; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001) or because of a positive relation between price and size (Stoll and Whaley, 1983) .
In this paper, we empirically test whether a firm's choice of its IPO price level relates systematically to other choices made by the firm and to its other characteristics, using a sample of 5619 IPOs from [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . We find strong evidence that it does, and make several contributions to the literature through our findings.
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1 As noted by Lipman (2000) , this decision seems to receive careful consideration. See also Blowers et al. (1999) and Deloitte & Touche (2000) . Listing requirements by NYSE and Nasdaq impose minimum levels on the public float, market capitalization and number of shareholders, which may also limit the price level choice, especially for small firms.
First, we provide new evidence on the relationship between IPO price and the individual-institutional ownership mix of the post-IPO firm. Research by Booth and Chua (1996) , Brennan and Franks (1997) , Stoughton and Zechner (1998) and Mello and Parsons (1998) suggests that ownership structure is an important consideration driving the firm's IPO decisions. However, these papers do not investigate what the firm does to generate the desired ownership structure. We establish a link between the firm's choice of IPO price and post-IPO ownership structure, and show that higher priced IPOs experience a higher fraction of institutional investment, a result that is both statistically and economically significant, and robust to controls for liquidity and size. Since more reputed underwriters are likely to have better access to institutional investors, we also investigate whether high-priced IPOs are more likely to be underwritten by more reputed underwriters. Our empirical results confirm that this is true.
Second, since many theories of IPO underpricing flow from ownership structure, we examine the relationship between IPO price level and underpricing, and find that this relationship is U-shaped. Prior research, e.g., Chalk and Peavy (1987) and Ibbotson et al. (1988) , has reported an inverse relationship between offer price and underpricing, with low-priced IPOs being more underpriced than others. We show that underpricing is higher for low-priced and for high-priced IPOs, and that the differences in underpricing across different price levels are statistically and economically significant. That underpricing increases with price for high-priced IPOs is a new result that has not been documented previously. We investigate whether this new finding may be an artifact of the Hanley (1993) partial adjustment phenomenon and find that it is not. Regardless of whether we use the mid-point of the initial filing price range or the final offer price, our inferences are the same.
2 The U-shape is robust even when we explicitly control for the price adjustment. When we divide our sample into pre and post-1990 subsamples to allow for differences arising from the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, we find the U-shaped pattern in both subsamples. The U-shape remains when we control for firm size, offer fraction, initial turnover, fractional offer price revision, underwriter reputation and listing exchange. Our finding of a positive relationship between offer price and institutional ownership and a U-shaped relationship between IPO price and underpricing suggests that different theories of IPO underpricing may apply to high and low-priced IPOs. Our finding of higher underpricing of high-priced IPOs is consistent with theories that suggest an important role for institutional investors, such as Benveniste and Spindt (1989) , who model underpricing as the cost of compensating informed investors for truthfully revealing the information they have, and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) , who model underpricing as compensation for future monitoring services. Our findings for low-priced IPOs are consistent with theories that suggest an important role for small uninformed investors, such as Rock (1986) , who models IPO underpricing as compensation to uninformed investors for the winner's curse; 2 The initial filing price range is the price range within which the firm initially expects the offer price to lie, as disclosed in its preliminary registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The final offer price is the price at which the offering eventually occurs, which may or may not be within the initial filing range. Brennan and Franks (1997) , who show that firms may choose to ration the allocation of shares in favor of small, diffuse investors in order to preserve private benefits of control; and Booth and Chua (1996) , who argue that firms may choose a lower price to promote diffuse ownership.
Third, we investigate whether the pattern of trading in the immediate aftermarket is systematically related to IPO price. Prior research has examined trading behavior immediately following the IPO. Krigman et al. (1999) show that initial turnover of the firm's shares is positively related to underpricing, and that block trades, presumably by institutions, account for a large fraction of initial turnover. Moreover, there is considerable evidence (e.g., McInish and Wood, 1992 ) that transactions costs are inversely related to the price, which may also influence trading. When we examine the relationship between offer price and initial turnover, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship. Low-priced IPOs trade relatively less, perhaps because they are more expensive to trade and/or because they are bought by retail investors who do not flip their IPO allocations. Surprisingly, high-priced IPOs also trade relatively less, although they are relatively more underpriced. Since institutional ownership is most concentrated in these IPOs, this finding is significant, given the results of Krigman et al. (1999) . Our results suggest that high-priced IPOs are bought by institutions as long-term holdings, whereas intermediate-priced IPOs are more likely to be flipped by the institutions that receive them in the initial allocation.
Finally, we analyze whether the IPO price is related to a firm's viability. Since institutions are widely thought to be better-informed investors, our finding that institutions seem to prefer buying and holding high-priced IPOs also suggests that high-priced IPOs may outperform low-priced IPOs. Following the approach in Seguin and Smoller (1997) , we analyze whether IPO price can explain the likelihood that a firm will later experience financial distress. We find that high-priced IPOs are less likely to delist due to financial distress in the first 5 years after the IPO. These results are robust to controlling for market capitalization and underwriter reputation.
3 Hanley (1993) finds no connection between underpricing and long-run performance of IPOs. Our results suggest that the connection may be non-monotonic: high-priced IPOs are more underpriced than intermediate-priced IPOs but subsequently perform better while low-priced IPOs are also more underpriced but subsequently perform worse.
Our finding of systematic differences across firms that pick different price levels when going public contradicts the widely held belief among academics that the choice of one price level over another is a ''neutral mutation''. While it is possible that an unobserved variable drives the choice of price, ownership, underpricing, etc., the differences in investor response to different price levels seem to be fundamentally important in explaining our observations. The offer price is one of the few variables 3 These results are consistent with the findings of Seguin and Smoller (1997) who show (for their sample of newly listed Nasdaq stocks) that the share price contains information about the long-run performance of listed firms. They find that the probability of distress delisting decreases monotonically with the initial price (defined as the closing price at the end of the first listed day) after controlling for market capitalization. They also show that low-priced stocks earn lower risk-adjusted returns than high-priced stocks.
that a firm directly controls at the IPO stage, and our results suggest that each firm will select the appropriate stock price that is consistent with its desired ownership structure. Firms that desire increased institutional participation (e.g., for monitoring reasons) and/or wish to explicitly crowd out na. ıve individual investors (e.g., to avoid the costs imposed by such investors) will select higher IPO prices. Firms that wish to avoid institutional participation (e.g., to avoid monitoring, as in Allen et al., 2000) or explicitly desire increased individual investor participation (e.g., to promote broad ownership and/or preserve control benefits) will select lower IPO prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature on the significance of the stock price level. Section 3 describes our data. In Section 4, we document the links between IPO price and ownership structure, and between IPO price and underpricing. We report the relationship between IPO price and initial turnover in Section 5. Section 6 presents our results on how IPO price is related to distress delisting. Section 7 concludes.
The significance of the stock price level
In this section, we review the literature that pertains to the potential significance of the stock price level, to provide the context for our analysis. The relevant literature can be classified into two streams: (a) empirical evidence from stock splits, especially on a retail investor preference for low-priced stocks; and (b) empirical evidence on institutional investor preference for high-priced stocks. Thereafter, we discuss the empirical implications suggested by this literature for IPOs.
Stock splits and retail investor preference for low-priced stocks
One stream of literature has investigated splits of seasoned stock issues (where a firm changes its share price level). Surveys of managers by Baker and Gallagher (1980) and Baker and Powell (1993) have documented that maintaining a preferred price level is the primary motivation for managers to undertake stock splits. Several studies have provided empirical support for such a preference. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) argue that stock splits are undertaken primarily to restore share prices to a ''normal'' range following a period of unusual growth. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) , who study American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), report that prior to their issuance in the U.S., ''ADRs are deliberately 'packaged' (in terms of the number of home shares represented by one ADR) to achieve a target U.S. price level''.
4 Angel (1997) suggests that firms seek to maintain their stock price in an optimal trading range in order to achieve an optimal tick size. Anshuman and Kalay (2002) argue that firms select an optimal stock price to minimize the total expected costs of liquidity trading, including adverse selection costs, discreteness-related costs and the opportunity costs of monitoring. Fernando et al. (1999) show that splits increase marketability of shares to retail investors, and Schultz (2000) concludes that splits broaden the shareholder base by encouraging the purchase of a firm's stock by small investors. Dhar et al. (2003) examine the trading of individual investors around stock splits and find that splits are associated with a shift towards less sophisticated individual investors.
But the stock splits literature is divided on the question of whether firms split their shares to achieve a desired stock price level or to signal private information. Fama et al. (1969) and Asquith et al. (1989) argue in favor of the signaling hypothesis by providing evidence of superior earnings and dividends by splitting firms around the split. Moreover, Ikenberry et al. (1996) and Desai and Jain (1997) demonstrate that splitting firms significantly outperform by about 7 percent in the year following the split and by about 12 percent in the 3 years following the split. Conroy and Harris (1999) suggest that both hypotheses may be valid by showing that investors benchmark stock splits to a firm's expected stock price level based on the price level it has historically maintained. They show that abnormal returns following the announcement of a split and analysts' forecast revisions are significantly higher when the split factor is larger than anticipated. Hence, it is difficult to isolate the effect of the price change from the signaling effect.
Institutional investor preference for high-priced stocks
The second stream of literature has studied whether institutional investors invest differentially in stocks trading at different price levels. Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) provide evidence that institutions seem to avoid investing in lowpriced stocks. This preference could be driven by the higher transactions costs associated with low-priced stocks. McInish and Wood (1992) show that the percentage bid-ask spread decreases with price levels. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) use price level as a proxy for liquidity. However, it is also possible that institutions may avoid investing in low-priced stocks, since these are viewed negatively as ''penny stocks''. While the existing evidence links price level and institutional investment in seasoned stocks, it is as yet unknown whether this institutional preference for high-priced stocks also applies in the case of IPOs.
Empirical implications
To summarize, the extant literature strongly suggests that different investor clienteles are attracted to different price levels. Anecdotal evidence and surveys of management have consistently suggested that a primary objective of stock splits is to increase ownership by smaller investors. The available empirical evidence (e.g., Schultz, 2000) supports this conjecture. The empirical evidence also supports the assertion that institutional investors avoid lower-priced shares and invest more in higher-priced shares. In particular, the literature reviewed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 suggests that low-priced IPOs will attract mainly retail investors, whereas highpriced IPOs will attract a larger fraction of institutional investors.
Such preferences, if they exist, will have important implications for IPO underpricing, since many theories of IPO underpricing motivate underpricing as compensation either to informed institutional investors or to uninformed retail investors for costs arising from their participation in the IPO. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model the IPO process as one in which allocation and underpricing are rewards to informed institutional investors for the information they provide about a firm's value. Stoughton and Zechner (1998) suggest that underpricing is the reward to large institutional investors for the monitoring benefits they are expected to provide in the future. In either case, firms seeking to attract an institutional clientele would choose a higher IPO offer price. If IPOs are targeted towards institutions for expected monitoring benefits, we would expect these institutions to retain their shares and not trade them in the immediate aftermarket. Hence, we would expect higher-priced IPOs to exhibit lower turnover in the aftermarket. If such monitoring is indeed successful in reducing potential agency problems, these firms should perform better after the IPO. However, note that this is not necessarily true if underpricing is compensation only for information revelation during the book-building process, since the institutions are fully rewarded for their information via underpricing, and they are not required to hold onto their shares beyond the first trading day.
In contrast, if managers want to preserve control benefits (e.g., Brennan and Franks, 1997) , they may want to structure the IPO to avoid institutional investors. Alternatively, some firms may want to avoid institutional investment, but not for any negative reasons. This could arise if some institutions are more interested in shortterm price appreciation, and thus force the firm to forego potentially valuable longterm investments such as R&D, as suggested by the results in Bushee (1998) . The inability to differentiate between these two types of firms will lead to a winner's curse problem, and result in higher underpricing (similar to Rock, 1986) . Both these types of firms will choose a low offer price, to make them more attractive to retail investors and less attractive to institutional investment. Additionally, Booth and Chua (1996) argue that firms may choose a lower price to promote broad ownership, presumably by exploiting the preference of retail investors for lower prices. Since broad ownership will be associated with higher total information costs, these issues would be underpriced by larger amounts. Low-priced IPOs that are targeted towards retail investors may also trade less in the aftermarket, either because these investors face more restrictions on flipping their shares or because transactions costs are higher for low-priced shares.
We explore the relationship between IPO offer price and institutional ownership, as well several of these other IPO metrics, in the rest of the paper.
Data

The sample
From the Global Financing Database of the Securities Data Company (SDC), we identify all initial public offerings of common stock by domestic (US) firms during the period 1981-1998. We require that the stock market data for the firm be available on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. We also require that the initial filing information be available. We then use several screens to get the final sample of IPOs. We exclude IPOs of closed-end funds, REITS, and ADRs, retaining only IPOs of corporations (CRSP share code 10 or 11) in our sample. We include IPOs if common stock was the only security that was issued, and exclude IPOs where the issue was for units comprised of common stock and some other security. We also require that the IPO be listed on CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq combined tapes not more than 2 months (42 trading days) after the offer date. This restriction reduces the possibility that our sample firms have traded elsewhere. Finally, to avoid possible data errors, we check that (a) the offer date is on or before the first trading date on CRSP, (b) the number of shares outstanding on the CRSP tapes is not less than the number of shares offered in the US (from SDC) and (c) the percentage institutional ownership is less than 100 percent. This gives us a final sample of 5619 IPOs.
We collect offering data (filing price which is computed as the mid-point of the initial price range, offer price, number of shares offered and offer date) and the identity of the lead underwriters from the SDC database. The closing price at the end of the first trading date, number of shares outstanding after the IPO and trading volume are taken from the CRSP tapes. Data on institutional ownership after the IPO comes from Spectrum. Percentage average spread data is from the TAQ database. The underwriter reputation ranking is from Carter and Manaster (1990) for IPOs prior to 1985 and from Carter et al. (1998) for subsequent IPOs.
For each firm, we calculate underpricing as the raw return from the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day. Firm size is the market value of equity, computed as the product of the offer price and the number of shares outstanding on the first trading day. We compute issue amount as the gross proceeds from the IPO (offer price times number of shares offered) excluding overallotments. 5 We adjust firm size and issue amount for price level changes using a seasonally adjusted GDP deflator. 6 The offer fraction is the number of shares offered in the IPO as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding after the IPO. The fractional offer price revision is the difference between the final filing price and the initial offer price, divided by the initial filing price. The turnover in the post-IPO aftermarket is computed over the first week or first listing day as being equal to the average daily share turnover as a fraction of the shares sold in the IPO.
As a proxy for liquidity, we compute the daily share turnover as the ratio of daily trading volume to the number of shares outstanding. Average turnover is defined as the average of the daily share turnover over 20, 40, 60, 80 or 100 trading days starting with the second week after listing. We also compute the average dollar volume of the shares traded during the same period.
7 As a third measure of liquidity, we use the average percentage spread in the month after the IPO. We measure post-offer institutional ownership as a fraction of the total shares outstanding after the IPO.
Sample characteristics
The average size of the firms in our sample (in constant 1998 dollars) is about $161 million and the median is about $74 million (Table 1 ). The post-IPO institutional ownership averages about 18 percent. 8 The average IPO exhibits substantial trading activity in the post-IPO period. The mean initial turnover is about 53 percent, suggesting that a little more than half the number of shares issued in the IPO changes hands on the first day itself. This is comparable to the mean initial turnover of 61.9 percent documented in Ellis et al. (2000) . The mean daily turnover in the first week is almost 17 percent.
The mean (median) offer price is $11.06 ($10.75) per share. The mean filing price is slightly higher at $11.28. On average, the offer price is revised downwards by 1.9 percent from the initial filing price, and the median revision is zero. This is similar to the findings by Hanley (1993) , who documents a mean (median) revision of À4:3 (0.0) percent for a sample of 1430 IPOs from 1983-1987. The median ranking for the lead underwriter is 8. The average (median) issue amount excluding any overallotments (constant 1998 dollars) is approximately $46 million ($24 million). This is larger than the average gross proceeds of $15 million for a sample of 1526 IPOs during 1975-1984 documented by Ritter (1991) . An average of almost 35 percent of the post-issue firm is sold in the IPO. The IPOs in our sample exhibit a mean underpricing of 13.1 percent, which is similar to what other researchers have documented. The median underpricing is much lower at 5.68 percent. We compute the money left on the table as the product of the number of shares sold in the IPO multiplied by the first day's price change. The average IPO left $5 million on the table, but the median is much smaller at $0.8 million. The mean (median) money left on the table is about 3 percent (1 percent) of the mean (median) IPO equity market value.
IPO price, institutional ownership, and underpricing
In this section, we present our results that link IPO price to institutional ownership and underpricing. We first examine the relationship between IPO price and institutional investment in our sample of IPOs.
9 Controlling for size and liquidity
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8 This is consistent with the available empirical evidence on IPO allocations. Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) , Aggarwal et al. (2002) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) indicate that the institutional investment in an IPO averages about 60-75%, and Aggarwal (2003) shows that institutions flip about 25% of the shares allocated to them. Assuming that an average firm sells about 1 3 rd of its shares in the IPO, this suggests that the post-IPO institutional ownership should be between 15-20% of shares outstanding. 9 We present our empirical results using only the initial filing price as our proxy for the firm's desired IPO price, since the choice of initial filing price is made before the IPO is marketed, whereas the final offer price incorporates information obtained during the pre-marketing phase. However, we obtain similar results (available upon request) when we use the final offer price. differences across firms, underwriter reputation and underpricing, we report that institutional investment is higher in IPOs that are offered at a higher price. We also show that high-priced IPOs are underwritten by more reputed underwriters. We then document the relationship between IPO price and underpricing in our sample of IPOs. In multivariate regressions that include firm size, fractional offer price revision, initial turnover, offer fraction, and underwriter reputation as control variables, underpricing exhibits a robust U-shaped pattern in IPO price. Both highpriced and low-priced IPOs are more underpriced relative to intermediate-priced IPOs. We identify the sample of 5619 IPOs of common stock in the United States over the period 1981-1998 from the Securities Data Company database (SDC) for which we have available data on the filing price. We include IPOs of domestic firms comprised only of common stock; IPOs of units comprised of common stock and other securities are excluded. Offer price is the price at which shares in the IPO were offered. Filing price is the mid-point of the high and low initial filing price. The offer price revision (PRCDF) is the change in final offer price from the mid-point of the initial filing range. Underwriter reputation (AVGUW) is the average of the underwriter reputation ranking for the lead managers (from Carter and Manaster, 1990 , for IPOs prior to 1985 and from Carter et al., 1998 , for all subsequent IPOs). Offer fraction (OFRFRAC) is the number of shares offered in the United States as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding, excluding overallotments. The gross proceeds of the IPO (ISSAMT) is the product of offer price and the number of shares offered in the IPO, excluding overallotments. Underpricing is the return from the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day. We estimate money left on the table as the product of the number of shares sold in the IPO and increase in share price on the first trading day. Market value of equity (MVE) is calculated as the product of offer price and the number of shares outstanding (from CRSP). For each firm, TURNOVER5 (TURNOVER1) is calculated as the average of the daily turnover (as a fraction of shares issued in the IPO) for the first 5 days (1 day) of listing. Institutional ownership after the IPO is taken from Spectrum and is computed as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding after the IPO. We adjust the market value of equity and the gross proceeds by the GDP deflator ð1998 ¼ 100Þ:
4.1. IPO price and institutional investment 4.1.1. Results We begin our analysis by exploring whether the IPO price is related to the ownership structure that results after the IPO. Specifically, we investigate whether institutions invest more in high-priced IPOs. In Section 2, we reviewed the literature that links the price level and institutional investment in seasoned firms. In addition to price level, there could be other characteristics that influence the investment decision of institutional investors. It is likely that the higher the fraction of the firm sold in the IPO, the larger will be the allocation to institutional investors. There is some evidence that prudent-man laws could bias institutional investment towards higher quality, large capitalization stocks, as documented by Del Guercio (1996) . Additionally, reputed underwriters have an incentive to protect their reputational capital by underwriting high quality IPOs. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between institutional ownership and both firm size and underwriter reputation. Falkenstein (1996) shows that mutual fund demand is higher for stocks with higher monthly turnover, probably because higher trading volume indicates lower transactions costs. We expect both average turnover and average dollar volume to be positively related to institutional ownership. Since some institutions could flip their shares in the aftermarket based upon the level of underpricing (Krigman et al., 1999) , we include underpricing as an additional explanatory variable.
In Table 2 , we report the results of various regressions using the post-IPO institutional ownership as the dependent variable and the initial filing price as our primary explanatory variable. Based on the discussion above, we include log of firm size, underwriter reputation, offer fraction, average turnover, log of average dollar volume (measured over various periods ranging from 20 to 100 days after listing, starting with the second week after listing), and underpricing as control variables. The univariate regression in model 1 shows that filing price is significantly positively related to institutional ownership ðt ¼ 25:5Þ: When we include all the control variables (average dollar volume and turnover measured over 20 days) in model 2, we show that consistent with our discussion above, underwriter reputation, firm size, offer fraction and average dollar volume are all significantly positively related to institutional ownership. However, underpricing is weakly positively related to institutional ownership, and turnover is negatively related to institutional ownership. In models 3-6, we use volume measured over 40, 60, 80 and 100 days after listing. The results are unchanged; the coefficient on filing price remains positive and significant. An increase in the filing price from $5.00 (10th percentile) to $17.00 (90th percentile) is associated with an increase of about 4 percent in institutional investment. This increase is economically large, representing almost 22 percent of the mean institutional investment across our sample. Hence, post-IPO institutional ownership is significantly impacted by the price level, both statistically and in economic terms.
One potential concern with the above analysis is that we include both the average turnover and log of average dollar volume after the IPO as explanatory variables.
The two variables are correlated, and the correlation coefficient ranges from 0.35 to 0.50. As a robustness check, we re-estimate these regressions using the average turnover or log of average dollar volume. Our results are unchanged, with the coefficient on IPO price remaining positive and significant. As an alternative measure of liquidity that could impact institutional investment, we include the percentage bidask spread in the 1 month after the IPO. Since, we have data from the TAQ database only from 1993, this restricts the sample to 1943 firms with all available data. The coefficient on the spread is negative as expected, suggesting that lack of liquidity Note: ÃÃÃ ; ÃÃ and Ã represent significance at the 1-, 5-and 10-percent levels, respectively. The left-hand side variable is the institutional ownership after the IPO for our sample of 4578 IPOs of US firms during 1981-1998, for which we have available data on institutional ownership (from Spectrum) and filing price (from the SDC). We compute the institutional ownership as a fraction of shares outstanding after the IPO. The institutional ownership is regressed on various firm-specific and issue characteristics. FILPRC is the average of the high and low initial filing price of the IPO. LNMVE is the natural log of the market value of equity, computed using the offer price ($ millions), adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator ð1998 ¼ 100Þ: AVGUW is the average of the underwriter reputation ranking for the lead managers (from Carter and Manaster, 1990 , for IPOs prior to 1985 and from Carter et al., 1998 , for all subsequent IPOs). OFRFRAC is the fraction of the total shares outstanding sold in the IPO. For each firm, TURNOVER is the average of the daily turnover (as a fraction of shares outstanding) over 20, 40, 60, 80 or 100 trading days starting from the second week after listing. DOLVOL is the natural logarithm of the average daily dollar volume over the same period. UNDPCT is the raw return from the offering price to the closing price on the first trading day. The table lists the parameter estimates from OLS regressions, t-values are in parentheses.
adversely impacts institutional investment.
10 However, our finding of a significant positive relationship between IPO price and institutional ownership remains unchanged.
We have shown that institutional investment is higher in high-priced IPOs. Since more reputed underwriters are likely to have access to a large pool of institutional investors, we expect that high-priced IPOs, which are directed more towards institutions, will be underwritten by more reputed underwriters. We estimate the following regression using the average underwriter reputation (AVGUW) as the dependent variable, and the natural log of market capitalization (LNMVE) and the IPO filing price (FILPRC The results strongly suggest that high-priced IPOs are more likely to be underwritten by more reputed underwriters. The coefficient on filing price is positive and significant at better than the one-percent level of significance. This result holds after we control for market capitalization, adjusted for inflation.
Implications
The above results provide empirical support for the prediction that institutional investors will tend to prefer high-priced IPOs over low-priced IPOs, while the opposite will be the case for individual investors. This is consistent with the findings in previous studies for seasoned stocks. As noted previously, many theories motivate IPO underpricing as compensation either to informed institutional investors or to uninformed retail investors for costs arising from their participation in the IPO. Thus, our findings suggest a systematic link between the IPO price level and underpricing. In the next section, we examine the implications of the link between IPO price and ownership for IPO underpricing.
IPO price and underpricing
Univariate relationship
We first examine the univariate relationship between IPO price and underpricing. We divide the sample into eight portfolios based on either the final offer price or the mid-point of the initial pricing range (filing price). We create portfolios at $3 intervals to ensure that we have adequate dispersion in price among the portfolios. Portfolio 1 consists of the IPOs with price less than $3 per share, and portfolio 8 consists of those IPOs priced at $21 or more per share. We report the underpricing for each of these portfolios. The results in Table 3 show a pronounced U-shaped pattern in underpricing as a function of both the final offer price and the initial filing
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10 These results are not reported separately in tables but are available upon request.
price.
11 Considering the final offer price based portfolios first (Panel A), the median underpricing in portfolio 1 is 19.53 percent. It declines monotonically through portfolio 4, which averages 2.5 percent. The underpricing then starts increasing and is 11.81 percent in portfolio 8. A similar pattern emerges when we examine the 25th and 75th percentile of underpricing in each of the portfolios. When we construct portfolios using the initial filing price instead of the final offer price, we observe a similar pattern (Panel B). The median underpricing declines from 20.38 percent in portfolio 1 to 3.85 percent in portfolio 6. The median underpricing increases to 5.62 percent in portfolio 8. This pattern suggests that the underpricing is higher both for high-priced and low-priced IPOs. The mean underpricing measures in our sample could be distorted by the very high price run-ups experienced by some firms during our sample period. Hence, we focus on the median underpricing measures, which are more reliable under these conditions. Underpricing is calculated as the return from the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day. We create eight portfolios based either on the final offer price (Panel A) or the initial filing price (the average of the high and low initial filing price, Panel B) at intervals of $3. Portfolio 1 consists of all IPOs with price less than $3.00, portfolio 2 consists of all IPOs with price greater than or equal to $3.00 but less than $6.00, and so on. Portfolio 8 includes all IPOs where the price is greater than or equal to $21.00. The sample consists of 5619 IPOs from 1981 to 1998.
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The evidence above indicates that IPO underpricing varies unconditionally in a non-linear fashion with initial filing price. However, Stoll and Whaley (1983) document a positive association between market value of equity and price per share for common stocks. There is evidence that a similar positive relationship between offer price and firm size exists in our sample. The Pearson correlation between initial filing price and firm size is 0.38. Thus, it is not clear if the variation in underpricing is due to firm size rather than price. In addition, other variables have been shown in the prior literature to affect IPO underpricing. We turn our attention to these issues below and verify whether this non-linear pattern is robust to these controls. Rock (1986) argues that underpricing arises to compensate uninformed investors for the adverse selection problem they face. Koh and Walter (1989) provide empirical support for the Rock (1986) model. We expect adverse selection to be more of an issue if the ex ante information asymmetry is higher. Therefore, ceteris paribus, IPOs that are more likely to be subject to depressed valuation due to information asymmetry will exhibit higher underpricing. As argued by Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Tinic (1988) , smaller issues are more likely to be speculative in nature and offered by start-up firms. Moreover, in the presence of fixed information costs, the relative cost of information may be high even for larger firms when a smaller fraction of their equity is offered to the public. Hence, we use offer fraction (number of shares offered as a percentage of total shares outstanding after the IPO) and log of the issue amount ($ million) as alternative proxies for ex ante uncertainty of the IPO. We expect a negative relationship between underpricing and both offer fraction and log of issue amount. On the other hand, an investment banker could use underpricing as a way to reduce marketing effort, which will be greater for larger issues (Baron, 1982) . This would imply a positive relationship between both offer fraction and log of issue amount, and underpricing. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that underwriters use underpricing (along with preferential allocation) to induce informed investors to reveal their private information. They suggest that if favorable information is revealed in the premarket, the underwriter responds by increasing the offer price to partially reflect this information. These IPOs would be priced in the upper part of the initial offer price range. Their allocation is rationed and they would be more underpriced. Under this partial adjustment hypothesis, we expect to see a positive relationship between underpricing and the fractional offer price revision. Hanley (1993) empirically shows that underpricing is positively related to the percentage revision in offer price from the original filing price. Hence, we include offer price revision as a control variable.
Several theoretical and empirical papers suggest that underwriter reputation is related to underpricing. For example, Carter and Manaster (1990) develop a model in which more reputed underwriters market lower-risk and higher-quality IPOs. Hence, we include underwriter reputation as a control variable. Confirmatory evidence that underwriter reputation is negatively related to underpricing is presented in Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter et al. (1998) . However, a recent article by Beatty and Welch (1996) documents that this relationship may have reversed in the 1990s. Various signaling theories (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989) hypothesize that underpricing is a positive signal of a firm's value, since only ''good firms'' will be able to recoup the cost of underpricing in a subsequent equity issue. But the available empirical evidence in Jegadeesh et al. (1993) and Michaely and Shaw (1994) does not support the implications of the signaling models. To the extent that underwriter reputation acts as an alternative signal of firm quality, we would expect IPOs marketed by more reputed underwriters to be underpriced by a smaller amount.
We include the initial turnover as an additional control variable. Ellis et al. (2000) show that the trading volume in the ''hot'' IPOs is more than double that of the other IPOs. Krigman et al. (1999) show that the mean initial turnover in ''cold'' IPOs is 46.5 percent, compared to 150.4 percent for the ''extra hot'' IPOs. Hanley (1993) also finds a similar result. Increased turnover in the aftermarket could be a measure of the extent of rationing in the pre-market. This could be especially true if the participation of some investors in the pre-market is limited. In that case, the offer price adjustment may not fully reflect all the information available in the aggregate market. This information would be revealed as investors trade in the aftermarket. Hence, we would expect a positive relationship between initial turnover and underpricing. Additionally, we include log of firm size as a control variable to verify if IPO price is related to underpricing, independent of firm size.
We have observed similar univariate relations between underpricing and IPO price when we use the initial filing price and the final offer price as proxies for IPO price. However, since the initial filing price is the firm's first choice of price and is unaffected by the pre-marketing of the IPO, we confine our multivariate analysis to the initial filing price.
Regression results.
Since our focus is on the relationship between price and underpricing, we estimate multivariate regressions of underpricing on the initial filing price, after including the control variables. The univariate results we report above suggest that underpricing is higher both for high-priced and for low-priced IPOs. To capture this non-linear pattern, we use both price and its square as our main explanatory variables. The results of our multivariate OLS regressions of underpricing on the explanatory variables and control variables are reported in Table 4 .
In model 1, we include only the price and its square. The coefficients of the filing price and its square are negative and positive respectively, and are statistically significant at the 1-percent level. This result confirms the univariate pattern we have documented earlier. In model 2, we regress the control variables (excluding the offer price revision) on underpricing. The coefficients on initial turnover and firm size are significantly positive at better than the 5-percent level of significance (t ¼ 26:6 and 2:4; respectively). Underwriter reputation and offer fraction are negatively related to underpricing (t ¼ À5:1 and À2.8 respectively).
We include filing price and the square of filing price as our main explanatory variables along with all the control variables in model 3. The coefficients on filing price and its square are in turn significantly negative ðt ¼ À13:2Þ and significantly positive ðt ¼ 7:8Þ; as predicted by our univariate results. The coefficients for initial turnover, firm size and offer fraction are all significantly positive, while the coefficient on underwriter reputation is not significant. This evidence of a non-linear U-shaped relationship between underpricing and the IPO price strongly supports the univariate results that we have documented earlier. In models 4 and 5, we include the fractional offer price revision as an additional control variable. The results are unchanged. While the inclusion of offer price revision reduces the magnitude of the coefficients on price and its square, they are still negative and positive respectively, and are significant at the 1-percent level (t ¼ À8:6 and 5:9; respectively). Note: ÃÃÃ ; ÃÃ and Ã represent significance at the 1-, 5-and 10-percent levels, respectively. For the sample of 5619 IPOs of US firms during 1981-1998 (where the filing price data is available), the underpricing calculated as the return from the offer price to the closing price on the first day of trading is regressed on various firm-specific and issue characteristics. FILPRC is the mid-point of the initial filing price in dollars of the IPO. AVGUW is the average of the underwriter reputation ranking for the lead managers (from Carter and Manaster, 1990 , for IPOs prior to 1985 and from Carter et al., 1998 , for all subsequent IPOs). PRCDF is the revision in the final offer price from the mid-point of the initial filing range, divided by the initial filing price. For each firm, initial turnover (TURNOVER1) is calculated as the ratio of the first day's trading volume to the number of shares issued in the IPO. OFRFRAC is the fraction of the total shares outstanding sold in the IPO. LNMVE is the natural log of the market value of equity, computed using the offer price ($ mil). The gross proceeds and market value of equity are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator ð1998 ¼ 100Þ: The table lists the parameter estimates from OLS regressions, t-values are in parentheses.
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To summarize, the results strongly support a U-shaped relationship between underpricing and the initial filing price. 12 The coefficients on price and its square are of the correct sign and statistically significant at the 1-percent level or better in all regression specifications in Table 4 . We control for the partial adjustment phenomenon by (a) using the mid-point of the initial filing price (which is chosen before selling activities commence); and (b) including the offer price revision as a control variable. We also include initial turnover, firm size, offer fraction and underwriter reputation as additional control variables. Our results are robust to these controls. 13 This result is new to the literature.
Sub-period analysis
The 1990s saw an upsurge in the number of high technology and internet-related IPOs. Several IPOs during this period saw dramatic price increases in the first day of trading, which is quite different from prior periods. Beatty and Welch (1996) note that contrary to prior research, underwriter reputation was positively related to underpricing in their sample of IPOs (1992 IPOs ( -1994 . In addition, the Penny Stock Reform Act became effective during 1991. This imposed a heavy burden on market making activities for low-priced stocks. Consistent with this, Seguin and Smoller (1997) show that after 1991, penny stocks constituted only a very small fraction of all firms listing on the Nasdaq. Consequently, the characteristics of IPOs in the two periods may be different. Hence, it is interesting to verify whether our results are robust across time. We divide our sample into two periods 1981-1990 and 1991-1998 . We replicate both the full model regressions in Tables 2 and 4 for these two sub-periods separately. Our two main conclusions thus far-that IPO price is positively related to institutional investment and that there is a U-shaped pattern in underpricing-are unaltered. In both sub-periods, institutional investment is higher in the high-priced IPOs. The coefficients on filing price and its square (in the underpricing regressions similar to those in Table 4 ) are negative and positive respectively, and are statistically significant.
14
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12 We obtain similar results (not reported) when we use the final offer price instead of the initial filing price. 13 We have also carried out several other robustness checks (not reported) to confirm the veracity of our results. These include (1) re-estimating both the full model regressions in Table 4 using a Tobit model instead of the OLS specification to allow for the possibility that underpricing is left-censored at zero percent due to stabilization by underwriters (Ruud, 1993; Schultz and Zaman, 1994; Aggarwal, 2000) ; (2) Repeating our analysis using a sub-sample of IPOs which listed on an exchange within three days of the IPO offer date; (3) replicating our results (a) excluding low-priced IPOs (less than $5), (b) excluding both low-priced IPOs and outliers (underpricing > 100%), (c) replacing the offer fraction with the log of gross proceeds of the IPO, (d) including a dummy variable for exchange listing (0 ¼ NYSE=AMEX; 1 ¼ Nasdaq), and (e) running the regressions separately for NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq. Our inference of a statistically significant non-linear relationship between IPO filing price and underpricing is unchanged.
14 Consistent with Beatty and Welch (1996) , we find that the coefficient on underwriter reputation is negative only in the 1981-1990 period, but is not significant in the 1991-1998 period.
Discussion and implications for theories of IPO underpricing
Our results thus far suggest that underpricing is significantly higher both for highpriced and for low-priced IPOs. That underpricing is higher for low-priced IPOs has already been documented earlier (e.g., Chalk and Peavy, 1987) . However, our finding that underpricing is also higher for high-priced IPOs is new to the literature. To provide an estimate of the economic significance of this result, we calculate the incremental money left on the table, as follows. The results in Table 3 suggest that the underpricing is smallest in portfolio 6, i.e., 15pPo18: In the absence of the upswing in underpricing, we assume that the expected underpricing in all the other portfolios would be similar to that of a typical, median firm in portfolio 6, i.e., 3.85 percent. Hence, the expected end of first day price would be 3.85 percent higher than the final offer price. We treat the difference between the actual day one closing price and the expected day one closing price, computed above, as the incremental price change on the first day. For a given firm, we compute the excess dollar cost of underpricing by multiplying the number of shares offered in the IPO and the incremental price change on the first day. The total excess dollar cost of underpricing for high-priced IPOs in portfolios 7 and 8 is nearly $4 billion, and constitutes about 57 percent of the total dollar cost of underpricing in these IPOs. We illustrate this further in Fig. 1 by plotting the ratio of the median excess dollar cost of underpricing to the median total dollar cost of underpricing for each of the eight price groups. A U-pattern is clearly evident. Fig. 2 plots the median total dollar cost of underpricing and the median excess dollar cost of underpricing separately across each of the price groups. It is very evident that the major economic effect of the underpricing U-shape is for high-priced IPOs. Hence, our finding of higher underpricing for the higherpriced IPOs is not only statistically significant, but is also economically very 3 < P < 6 6 < P < 9 9 < P < 12 12 < P < 15 15 < P < 18 18 < P < 21 21 < P % excess money to total money left on the table Fig. 1 . Ratio of excess to total dollar cost of underpricing. We plot the excess dollar cost of underpricing as a percentage of the total cost for a median firm across $3 filing price groups in a sample of 5619 IPOs from 1981-1998. significant since it gives rise to a large fraction of the total amount of money left on the table in IPOs. The evidence presented above demonstrates a robust U-shaped relationship between underpricing and the IPO price. In the previous section, we documented a positive relationship between IPO prices and post-IPO institutional ownership, after controlling for size differences across IPOs, underwriter reputation, underpricing and various measures of liquidity. Taken together, this evidence suggests that different theories of IPO underpricing may apply to high and low-priced IPOs.
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Our finding of higher underpricing of high-priced IPOs is consistent with theories that suggest an important role for institutional investors, such as Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) . Our findings for low-priced IPOs are consistent with theories that suggest an important role for small uninformed investors, such as Rock (1986) , Brennan and Franks (1997) , and Booth and Chua (1996) .
In addition to deriving their implications from the characteristics of investors who participate in an IPO, the above theories of IPO underpricing also have significant implications for trading in the immediate aftermath of the IPO. We turn to this question in the next section.
IPO price and initial turnover
Thus far, we have shown that high-priced IPOs are associated with higher institutional investment. We have also shown that such IPOs display higher underpricing relative to intermediate-priced 3 < P < 6 6 < P < 9 9 < P < 12 12 < P < 15 15 < P < 18 18 < P < 21 21 < P
$ million
Excess dollar cost of underpricing Dollar cost of underpricing Wilhelm (1997), it is common knowledge that institutional investors are better informed and have significantly greater ability to obtain IPO allocations. Since our findings suggest that they are selective in investing in IPOs, whether they proceed to flip or hold their IPO allocations is an interesting empirical question. The Benveniste and Spindt (1989) framework provides no a priori reason for them to hold their allocation beyond the first trading day, at which time they are fully rewarded for the information they provided during the pre-marketing phase of the IPO. On the other hand, if firms also target institutional investors for their monitoring services, as suggested by Stoughton and Zechner (1998) , they may continue to hold their allocations for a longer term to reap continuing rewards from their monitoring activity. In the latter case, high-priced IPOs will exhibit relatively lower turnover in the aftermarket. On the other hand, low-priced IPOs that are sold primarily to retail investors may also trade less in the immediate aftermarket. These IPOs may be subject to higher transactions costs, since transactions cost is inversely related to price (e.g., McInish and Wood, 1992) . Additionally, small investors may be less willing or able to trade after the IPO. 15 Hence, if investors buy both high-priced and low-priced IPOs with a longer investment horizon than investors in intermediatepriced IPOs, we expect lower initial turnover in both low-priced and high-priced IPOs relative to intermediate-priced IPOs.
We use initial turnover (as a fraction of shares issued in the IPO) as the dependent variable and estimate its relationship with filing price in a regression framework. Since price and size are related, we include the log of market value as a control variable. Krigman et al. (1999) show that initial turnover is positively related to underpricing, hence we include underpricing as a control variable. They also show that block trades, presumably by large institutional investors, account for a large fraction of the initial turnover. If institutions trade more often than individuals, we expect a positive relationship between institutional ownership and initial turnover. In addition, if there is positive information revealed in the pre-market, we could expect that the demand for these shares would be high. The high demand during the premarketing phase results in rationing the allocation of the IPO, and we expect that these IPOs will exhibit high turnover in the immediate aftermarket. Hence, we include the fractional revision in offer price as an additional control variable and expect it to be positively related to initial turnover.
We find a non-linear relationship between IPO price and turnover (Table 5 ). When we include only the filing price and its square in model 1, the coefficients on the price and the squared term are positive and negative respectively, and are significant at the 1-percent level. When we also include the control variables (model 2), underpricing, log of firm size, institutional ownership and the fractional offer price revision are all significantly positively related to initial turnover. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficients on filing price and square of filing price remain significantly positive and negative, respectively. In models 3 and 4, we repeat our analysis using the 15 There is considerable anecdotal evidence that retail investors are more likely to hold their allocations and less likely to move out of the stock as a group. This may be due in part to the fact that these investors seem to face many more restrictions against flipping than large investors. average turnover in the first week as the dependent variable instead of the first day turnover. The results are unchanged. Turnover, whether measured over the first day or the first week, is lower both for high-priced and for low-priced IPOs.
The results in this subsection indicate that low-priced IPOs trade relatively less, possibly due to higher transactions costs associated with these stocks or due to the long-term investment horizon of investors in these stocks. It is more significant that high-priced IPOs also seem to trade relatively less. Our turnover results provide an additional basis for differentiating between the types of IPOs to which the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) models of IPO underpricing apply. Institutional investors in intermediate-priced IPOs may be more inclined to cash out quickly, thereby locking in the rewards for their information. In contrast, investors in high-priced IPOs seem less inclined to do so, suggesting that they hold Note: ÃÃÃ ; ÃÃ and Ã represent significance at the 1-, 5-and 10-percent levels, respectively. We identify the sample of 5619 IPOs of common stock in the United States over the period 1981-1998 from the Securities Data Company database (SDC) for which we have available data on the filing price. The left-hand side variable is the initial turnover on the first listing day (models 1-2) or the average turnover in the first listing week (models 3-4). Daily volume turnover is calculated as the ratio of trading volume to number of shares sold in the IPO. FILPRC is the mid-point of the initial filing price in the IPO. INSTT is the institutional ownership after the IPO computed as a fraction of shares outstanding after the IPO. The offer price revision (PRCDF) is the change in final offer price from the mid-point of the initial filing range, divided by the initial filing price. LNMVE is the natural log of the market value of equity, computed using the offer price ($ millions). The market value of equity is adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator ð1998 ¼ 100Þ: Underpricing (UNDPCT) is the return from the offer price to the closing price on the first trading day. The table lists the estimates (t-values) from OLS regressions. these stocks for a longer period to reap benefits both from the information they provide during the pre-IPO phase and from the monitoring services they provide during the post-IPO phase.
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If institutional investors have superior stock-picking ability and are successful in reducing agency problems through their monitoring activities, the firms they invest in at the IPO stage (i.e., high-priced IPOs) should outperform their peers. In the following section, we analyze the link between IPO price and performance, measured by the likelihood of delisting due to financial distress.
6. IPO price and delisting due to financial distress Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) document that IPOs underperform in the 3-5 years following the offering. However, a recent paper by Brav and Gompers (1997) provides evidence that most of the under-performance is concentrated in small, non-venture backed IPOs. Furthermore, Seguin and Smoller (1997) show that lowpriced stocks are more likely to end up in financial distress. Our findings hitherto also suggest the possibility that there may be systematic differences in long-run performance between high-priced and low-priced IPOs. Additionally, Seguin and Smoller (1997) and Carter et al. (1998) show that IPOs marketed by more reputed underwriters perform better in the long run than those sold by less reputed underwriters. We investigate whether IPO price helps explain long-run performance after controlling for differences in firm size and underwriter reputation.
We analyze whether IPO filing price can help explain the likelihood that a firm will experience financial distress. As in Seguin and Smoller (1997) , we consider a firm to be distressed if in the five years after the offering, it does not trade on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq and has been delisted for reasons other than a merger or an exchange offer. We use as our dependent variable a dummy that takes the value '1' if the firm is viable at the end of 5 years after the IPO and '0' otherwise. In logistic regressions (Table 6 ), our main explanatory variable is the filing price. We use log of firm size and underwriter reputation as control variables. When we include only the filing price (model 1), the coefficient is significantly positive. When we include the control variables in models 2-4, the coefficients on log of firm size and underwriter reputation are positive and significant. This is consistent with the findings of Seguin and Smoller (1997) and Carter et al. (1998) . Nonetheless, consistent with the arguments made above, the coefficient on IPO price remains positive and significant. High-priced IPOs are less likely to delist due to financial distress within 5 years after the IPO. Since our sample firms include IPOs until 1998 for which we do not have five post-IPO years, we confirm these results using a subsample of firms from 1981 to 1993. In unreported regressions, the coefficient on filing price remains positive and significant.
Concluding remarks
We make several contributions to the literature. We ask whether investors are indifferent to the choice of a share price level by firms going public. We find that they are not. We find that institutional ownership tends to be higher and retail ownership tends to be lower at higher price levels, that higher-priced IPOs are underwritten by more reputed underwriters, that the relationship between IPO price level and underpricing is U-shaped, and that post-IPO turnover is lower for both high-priced and low-priced IPOs relative to mid-priced IPOs. We find that firms choosing a higher (lower) stock price, higher (lower) reputation underwriters, and a more (less) institutional investor base, experience lower (higher) mortality rates. Overall, our findings help to resolve an important question that has been pending in the finance literature, namely, whether the corporate decision that involves picking a share price level has economic significance. Our results provide strong evidence that it does.
The economic significance of the price level appears to be driven by the diverse preferences of retail and institutional investors with regard to price level. The fact that such preferences even exist is surprising, since it runs counter to a fundamental tenet of expected utility theory-that economic agents should be indifferent to various representations of the same choice problem. Explanations based on normative economic theory, such as liquidity differences across differently priced stocks or a positive relationship between price and size, cannot satisfactorily explain all our results.
One issue for future research that arises from our findings is whether the offer price is a manifestation of more basic economic measures of the firm. What we show is that high-priced IPOs are more underpriced and have lower turnover relative to Note: ÃÃÃ ; ÃÃ and Ã represent significance at the 1-, 5-and 10-percent levels, respectively. We identify the sample of 5619 IPOs of common stock in the United States over the period 1981-1998 from the Securities Data Company database (SDC) for which we have available data on the filing price. The dependant variable is a dummy variable that takes the value '0' if the firm is delisted for reasons of financial distress within 5 years after the IPO (financially distressed) and '1' otherwise (financially viable). The logistic regression models the likelihood of the firm remaining viable. FILPRC is the mid-point of the initial filing price of the IPO. Firm size (LNMVE) is the natural log of market value of equity computed using the offer price ($ mil) and adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator ð1998 ¼ 100Þ: Underwriter reputation (AVGUW) is the average of the underwriter reputation ranking for the lead managers (from Manaster, 1990, and Carter et al., 1998 intermediate-priced IPOs, and they have more institutional investment, higherreputation underwriters and higher long-run performance relative to all other IPOs. There is no comprehensive economic theory linking these variables to stock price levels.
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A second issue is whether there is an optimal price level at which a firm should go public, at least from the standpoint of the amount of money left on the table. While the stock splits literature has not been able to dispel the notion that the choice of one price level over another is merely a neutral mutation, our results demonstrate that the differences in the amount of money left on the table are both economically and statistically significant across different price levels.
